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Comment
THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT: A CONFLICT
OF PUBLIC POLICY AND CONTRACT LAW
INTRODUCTION
In 1908 the Federal Employers Liability Act' was enacted to make it
reasonably possible for railroad workers to recover for personal injuries
sustained in the course of their employment.2 The Act supplanted the
inadequate common law rules of recovery3 for railroad injuries and created a
federal cause of action 4 grounded in a railroad's failure to provide its
employees with a safe place to work.5 This statutory scheme stops short of
imposing absolute liability upon the railroad for injuries to its employees by
requiring that the injury or death result in whole or in part from the
negligence of the carrier, including the railroad's negligent failure to furnish
its employees with adequate equipment or safe surroundings.6 The burden of
proving negligence under the statute is mitigated, however, by the fact that
the existence of an unsafe condition may itself be viewed as evidence of
negligence which will permit the case to go to the jury if causation might be
inferred.7
As a practical matter, therefore, any failure to maintain a safe place to
work will usually constitute negligence under the FELA standard, even
when the injury or death occurs on premises which are neither maintained
1. 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FELA or the Act].
2. In Justice Douglas' words, "[t]he Federal Employers' Liability Act was
designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and
lives which it consumed in its operations." Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68
(1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). Lewis, Federal Employers Liability Act, 14 S.C.L.Q.
447, 447 (1962) reports that the average life expectancy of a railroad switchman in
1893 was seven years and that in 1907, the year before the Act was passed, 4,534
railroad men were killed in railroad work and 87,634 were injured.
3. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970) removes contributory negligence as a bar to recovery and
provides for a diminution of damages in proportion to the plaintiff's contributory
negligence, while §§ 51 and 54 together eliminate the defenses of assumption of risk
and the fellow servant rule.
4. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970) provides for concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal
courts.
5. Although the Act does not speak of a duty to provide a "safe place to work,"
this term is frequently employed by courts to describe the railroad's FELA liability for
injuries caused by negligent defects in its roadbed, rolling stock, or other equipment.
See, e.g., Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Fitzjohn, 165 F.2d 473, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1948).
6. 45 U.S.C. §51 (1970).
7. E.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 351-53 (1943). See generally Richter & Forer,
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 12 F.R.D. 13 (1952).
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nor controlled by the railroad.8 The duty to maintain safe conditions is
nondelegable, 9 and the fact that the railroad does not own the place at
which its employee works and is therefore under no primary obligation to
keep it safe, does not relieve the railroad of the liability created by the
statute. 0 In cases where a railroad employee is injured in the course of
employment but on unsafe premises owned by a third party, the railroad's
negligence is usually described in terms of a failure either to secure the
correction of the offending condition or to warn its employee of the danger
created by it."
Railroads which incur liability by virtue of this nondelegable statutory
duty to maintain safe working conditions often claim indemnity from those
third parties whose actual maintenance of an unsafe condition results in a
compensable injury to a railroad employee. Such claims commonly arise in
connection with the operation of trains on spur tracks constructed over
property owned by a private industry in order to connect the industry's plant
or warehouse with the railroad's main right of way. The contracts executed
by railroads with various industries for the construction and maintenance of
such privately owned sidetracks usually contain an indemnity agreement
12
composed of two clauses: The first clause typically provides that the
industry shall fully indemnify the railroad for losses resulting from any
negligent act or omission of the industry or any unsafe condition on or about
the sidetrack (occasionally referring specifically to unsafe track clearan-
ces), 13 while the second clause stipulates more generally that losses incurred
8. E.g., Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Conley, 293 F.2d 612, 613 (10th Cir. 1961);
Kooker v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 258 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1958); Terminal R.R.
Ass'n v. Fitzjohn, 165 F.2d 473, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1948); Porter v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
327 Ill. App. 645, 649, 65 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1946).
9. E.g., Payne v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 309 F.2d 546, 549 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 827 (1962).
10. E.g., Chicago G.W. Ry. v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 1956).
11. See, e.g., Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 183 F.2d 902, 912 (9th
Cir. 1950).
12. It is generally recognized that because the railroad is not required to furnish
sidetracks to industries as part of its duties to the public as a common carrier, it may
condition its consent to provide one upon the execution of a contract of indemnity.
See, e.g., Sunlight Carbon Co. v. Saint Louis & S.F.R.R., 15 F.2d 802, 805 (8th Cir.
1926).
13. See, e.g., text accompanying note 23 infra. Some sidetrack agreements refer
only to "acts or omissions" of the industry in the indemnity clause, but contain an
additional covenant in which the industry promises to maintain safe track clearances.
See, e.g., Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 183 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir.
1950). Under such agreements, the industry's failure to maintain safe clearances is, of
course, interpreted as a negligent "act or omission" within the meaning of the
indemnity clause. See, eg., id. at 911. Other agreements refer to the railroad's right to
be held harmless for injuries resulting from unsafe clearances in a third clause which
is not merely a covenant in that it expressly provides for indemnity. See, e.g., text
accompanying note 88 infra. Each of these three drafting alternatives appears to
express, with varying degrees of specificity, the intent of the parties that the railroad
be fully indemnified for losses resulting from the industry's failure to maintain safe
track clearances along the sidetrack.
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through the joint or concurrent negligence of the railroad and the industry
shall be borne by them equally. 14 This second clause entitles the railroad to
contribution from the industry, rather than full indemnity.
The vast majority of cases in which the construction and application of
these two clauses have been litigated have arisen out of a recurrent situation
in which a railroad employee is killed or injured as a result of the railroad's
operation of a train over a spur track rendered unsafe by a condition
(usually an encroachment on safe track clearances) created or maintained
by the industry. The railroad, after being found negligent under the statute
or reaching a settlement, sues under the indemnity contract to recover
amounts paid to its employee or his estate. The application of these dual-
clause contracts to this recurrent fact pattern has consistently generated an
interesting conflict between elementary canons of contract construction -
which suggest that the parties must have intended the full indemnity clause
to apply - and a fundamental public policy principle which suggests that
the contribution clause should be applied to prevent the indemnification of
the railroad for the consequences of its own negligence. 15 Although a
majority of courts have applied the indemnity clause on such facts, a
substantial minority of decisions have held, for reasons of public policy, that
the rights of the parties should be governed by the contribution clause which
limits the railroad's recovery to one-half of its loss.
This Comment will examine the majority view regarding the reconcilia-
tion and application of these clauses in this common factual context and
conclude that it represents a sensible synthesis of contract principles and
public policy considerations. Having explicated the principles underlying
the majority view that the indemnity clause applies, a critical analysis will
be made of several significant lines of departure from it, each of which
results in the application of the contribution clause. Finally, it will be
suggested that the failure of the courts to determine consistently the rights
of the parties under these contracts stems from a failure to identify and to
balance in light of the particular circumstances of FELA liability, the
interests underlying the neutral construction of written contracts and the
ostensibly countervailing policy considerations. While it is clear that the
majority view effectuates the expressed intent of the parties through the
neutral construction of a written instrument, it is not at all clear that the
departures from it are in fact justified by safety policy considerations when
a railroad seeks indemnification for liability incurred under the liberal
provisions of the statute.
BACKGROUND
Although tort liability under the FELA is in no way dependent upon
state law, a railroad's right to indemnity or contribution for FELA
14. See, e.g., text accompanying note 24 infra.
15. See generally United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970); 41 AM. JUR. 2d
Indemnity § 15 (1968).
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liability depends entirely upon state law,1 6 and all states subscribe to the
policy that contractual insulation from the legal consequences of negligent
acts should be judicially restricted.' 7 This policy is expressed in the general
rule that an indemnity contract will not be construed to indemnify a party
against losses resulting from his own negligence unless such intention is
expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.18 In conformance with this
general rule, courts have been tempted to apply the contribution clause when
the railroad seeks full indemnity for its FELA liability, on the theory that
the railroad's losses resulted at least in part from its own negligence because
the presence of some railroad negligence is a prerequisite to FELA
liability. According to this reasoning, the contribution clause should be
applied because allowing full indemnity would effectively insulate the
railroad from losses occasioned by its (statutory) negligence, and the
combination of mutually exclusive indemnity and contribution clauses, each
of which arguably applies to the same occurrence, creates an ambiguity
which falls short of the requisite clear and unequivocal expression of intent
that the indemnity clause apply. This line of analysis dictates that the
contribution clause be applied whenever the existence of a contractual
ambiguity permits a strict construction of the contract against the railroad
to avoid indemnifying the railroad for its role, however minor, in the
negligent injury of one of its employees.
As a matter of neutral contract construction, however, a majority of
courts have been inclined to apply the indemnity clause where the industry
created or maintained the unsafe condition, despite the existence of the
railroad's FELA negligence, on the theory that when read together in
accordance with basic contract principles, the clauses clearly express
without real ambiguity the parties' intention that the indemnity clause
govern. This argument proceeds as follows: because the railroad could not
16. Brenham v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 F. Supp. 119, 123 (W.D. La. 1971) (citing
cases), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972).
17. See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 213-17 (1970).
18. In United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals that a contractual provision should not
be construed to permit an indemnitee to recover for its own negligence unless
the court is firmly convinced that such an interpretation reflects the intention
of the parties. This principle, though variously articulated, is accepted with
virtual unanimity among American Jurisdictions.
Id. at 211. The Court's opinion also articulated the two prevailing views as to how this
intent must be manifested:
A number of courts take the view, frequently in a context in which the
indemnitee was solely or principally responsible for the damages, that there
can be indemnification for the indemnitee's negligence only if this intention is
explicitly stated in the contract. [citations].
Other cases do not require that indemnification for the indemnitee's
negligence be specifically or expressly stated in the contract if this intention
otherwise appears with clarity. [citations].
id. at 211 n.15. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 15 (1968).
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incur (FELA) liability in the absence of some negligence, the parties must
have intended that the indemnity clause apply in some instances where the
railroad was negligent. The automatic application of the contribution clause
when the railroad has been found negligent under the statute would
therefore defeat the expressed intention of the parties by effectively reading
out of the contract the indemnity clause which the parties themselves
included - a result which is totally at odds with the principle that courts
construe contracts so as to effectuate the manifested intent of the parties.
This basic analysis is expressed in three fundamental rules of contract
construction: the intention of the parties must be gathered from the contract
as a whole, not one clause in isolation; meaning and effect must be given to
all of the contract's provisions; where two clauses arguably encompass the
same occurrence, the more specific must prevail over the more general. The
rule that the indemnity clause, which either expressly refers to or more
clearly contemplates losses resulting from unsafe clearances created by the
industry, should prevail over the more general language of the contribution
clause'9 also assures that meaning and effect is given to both clauses
because the application of the more general clause in instances where either
clause might apply necessarily deprives the more specific clause of its
intended application.
19. Although it is perhaps not entirely clear from the wording of the clauses
(except where unsafe conditions are specifically referred to in the indemnity clause)
that the indemnity clause is more narrowly focused than the contribution clause, a
brief examination of the evolution of sidetrack agreements strongly suggests this to
be the case. Dual-clause agreements appear to have developed in response to various
problems emanating from single-clause agreements which provided for indemnity
only. In construing single-clause agreements, courts generally focused on the
language employed rather than the relative negligence of the parties. Such
agreements were often phrased in terms of losses arising out of the operation of trains
over the sidetrack rather than the acts or omissions of the industry. See, e.g., Cacey v.
Virginian Ry., 85 F.2d 976 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 657 (1937). If the
exculpatory clause was worded so as to convince the court that the parties intended
the railroad to be held harmless for the consequences of its own negligent acts, it
would be enforced regardless of the nature and extent of the railroad's negligence. See,
e.g., id.; Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atlantic Co., 66 Ga. App. 791, 19 S.E.2d 364 (1942).
These agreements were intended to protect the railroad against losses arising out of
the additional exposure to liability which was concomitant with the normal operation
of its trains over premises that it neither owned nor controlled, but, in the unusual
situation in which the railroad was primarily responsible for the loss, such
agreements obviously did more. In addition, some courts (understandably) tended to
require much more specificity when the loss resulted largely from the negligence of
the railroad, thereby importing an element of comparative fault into what was
otherwise a purely contractual determination. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Layman,
173 Or. 275, 145 P.2d 295 (1944) (citing cases). See generally note 18 supra. The dual-
clause agreements evolved as an attempt to rectify this situation by neutralizing the
obvious risk of additional exposure to liability arising out of the existence of unsafe
conditions created or maintained by the industry, while making it clear that the
industry would not bear the entire burden if the railroad's independent negligence
significantly broadened the element of causation (e.g., where a train collides with an
obstruction because its brakes are defective or the engineer is intoxicated).
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THE MAJORITY VIEW
The majority rule for construing the indemnity and contribution clauses
in effect synthesizes contract and public policy principles by recognizing
that the rights of the parties are governed solely by their contract 2 while
relying on the policy principles embodied in the rules of common law
indemnity2 to help determine the parties' contractual intent. The seminal
case of Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Co. 22 contains a
carefully reasoned analysis of the mechanics of this synthesis. In that case
a railroad brakeman was injured when he was caught between the caboose
on which he was riding and a cart left near the track by a lumber company
employee in violation of an agreement respecting minimum track clearan-
ces. The brakeman recovered a substantial judgment against the railroad
under the FELA on the theory that the railroad was negligent in permitting
the cart to remain on the track and in failing to warn him of the presence of
the obstruction. After the award, the railroad sued the lumber company on
the contract for the amounts it had paid to its employee under the statute.
The contract's indemnity clause stated that the industry would "'indemnify
and hold harmless [the] Railroad for loss, damage, injury or death from any
act or omission of [the] Industry: . . to the person or property of the parties
hereto and their employees . . . while on or about said track.'"23 It was
followed by a contribution clause providing that "'if any claim or liability,
other than from fire, shall arise from the joint or concurring negligence of
both parties hereto, it shall be borne by them equally.' "24
20. For a detailed discussion of the rationale of the rule that a contractual
obligation supersedes and abrogates the common law rules respecting the rights to
indemnity and contribution as it applies to sidetrack agreements, see Southern Pac.
Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 216 Or. 398, 338 P.2d 665 (1959) (to interpret an
indemnity provision as a restatement of the common law would be to treat it as
surplusage because the railroad would acquire no greater rights of indemnity than it
already enjoyed without recourse to the covenant). See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 1471, at 864 (1950) for the accepted rule that "[a] railroad may lawfully contract with
one permitted to use a spur track or occupy part of the right of way ... to exempt
itself from liability caused by its own negligence or that of its servants."
21. The public policy implications of the common law rules of indemnity are
evident in Dean Prosser's conclusion that, in the broadest sense, they embody "a
shifting of responsibility from the shoulders of one person to another; and the duty to
indemnify will be recognized in cases where community opinion would consider that
in justice the responsibility should rest upon one rather than the other." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 313 (4th ed. 1971). The promotion of justice
in this instance is also viewed as the promotion of safety in that placing the burden
of ultimate liability upon the "real" wrongdoer provides an incentive to act safely. See
text accompanying notes 154 & 155 infra.
22. 183 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Bridal Veil Lumber
Co., 219 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1955); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Alpha Portland Cement Co.,
218 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1955); Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Anthony, 199 F. Supp. 286 (W.D.
Ark. 1961), rev'd, 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
23. 183 F.2d at 906.
24. Id. at 907 n.3.
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After finding that negligence on the part of the railroad had concurred
with that of the industry to cause the accident, the trial court applied the
contribution clause, ruling that the loss should be borne by the parties
equally.2 5 Without disturbing this finding of railroad negligence, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, construing the
contract to provide full recovery under the provisions of the indemnity
clause. The appellate court's analysis of the scope of the clauses started from
the plausible assumption that when the parties contemplated the possibility
of claims for indemnity, they must have understood that in the ordinary
situation no occasion for seeking indemnity would arise unless the
indemnitee had been found guilty of some fault, for otherwise no judgment
could have been recovered from him.26 It follows that the parties could not
have intended that any finding of negligence on the part of the railroad
would automatically trigger the contribution clause because this would leave
the indemnity clause with virtually no application.2 7 Because the court
believed that the parties must have intended the indemnity clause to have
some application, it perceived its primary task as one of elucidating that
intent and, by implication, the intended scope of each clause. In so doing,
the court in Booth-Kelly reasoned that although liability must stem from the
terms of the contract rather than from common law obligations, an
examination of the common law rules of indemnity and contribution, as
important circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, would
provide the key to determining its meaning. In analyzing the contractual
terms against the background of the common law, the Booth-Kelly court
concluded that the indemnity clause enunciates the rule of section 95 of the
Restatement of Restitution, which provides that:
Where a person has became [sic] liable with another for harm
caused to a third person because of his negligent failure to make safe a
dangerous condition of land or chattels, which was created by the
misconduct of another or which, as between the two, it was the other's
duty to make safe, he is entitled to restitution from the other for
expenditures properly made in discharge of such liability, unless after
discovery of the danger, he acquiesced in the continuation of the
condition.28
25. Id. at 906. The district court's opinion was not published.
26. Id. at 907.
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTION § 95 (1937). Comment a to this section goes on
to explain that
[tihe rule stated in this Section applies to situations where a carrier is
responsible for the condition of its right of way or a municipality is
responsible for the condition of a public highway and a third person by
negligence creates a condition dangerous to travelers thereon, or, having
undertaken to make safe a dangerous condition, fails to do so. It applies also
to cases where a municipality is made liable for harm caused by the unsafe
condition of a road or sidewalk and where as between the two the primary
responsibility is upon an adjacent landowner or upon a public utility which
1978]
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On the same analysis, the court determined that the contribution clause was
intended to supersede the rule precluding contribution between joint
tortfeasors2 9 stated in section 102 as follows:
Where two persons acting independently or jointly, have negligently
injured a third person or his property for which injury both became
liable in tort to the third person, one of them who has made expenditures
in discharge of their responsibility is not entitled to contribution from
the other.30
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that because these
sections comprised the rules under which the parties would have been
required to function had there been no contract, it was fair to assume that
they had them in mind as they considered to what extent they would alter or
reaffirm those obligations by their writing.3 1 The Booth-Kelly construction is
supported by the fact that it expands the railroad's common law right to
compensation rather than contracting it as the lower court's reading
would.32 This interpretation is therefore consistent with the presumption
that the indemnity agreement was executed primarily for the purpose of
protecting the railroad against exposure to additional liability arising out of
circumstances largely beyond its control, as part of the consideration for
furnishing the sidetrack on the industry's property.33 According to this view,
the contract preserved the railroad's section 95 right to full indemnity when
it was passively or secondarily negligent in failing to make safe a condition
created by the industry's active or primary negligence34 in placing the cart
uses the road. The rule is also applicable to situations in which a person has a
non-delegable duty with respect to the condition of his premises but has
entrusted the performance of his duty to a third person, either a servant or an
independent contractor.
29. Joint tortfeasors are persons in pari delicto or equal fault in relation to an
injury. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 21, §52, at 313-23.
30. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 102 (1937).
31. 183 F.2d at 907.
32. "An important factor in bringing us to this view is our belief that the parties
would not have intended that Southern Pacific's rights to indemnity, which it might
have claimed in the absence of such a paragraph [containing the indemnity
agreement), were to be trimmed down, or in any manner diminished." Id. at 910.
33. See note 19 supra.
34. Although the classification of negligence as either active or passive is a
somewhat confused area of the law, see notes 173 to 175 and accompanying text infra,
it can be generally stated that passive negligence is commonly associated with the
violation of a duty through inaction, usually the failure to discover or correct a
dangerous condition for which another is primarily responsible. Conversely, active
negligence is usually said to consist in the violation of a duty through action and is
often associated with primary responsibility for the creation of an unsafe condition.
See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 928 (1966) for a comprehensive collection of railroad
cases dealing with active and passive negligence in the context of common law rights
of indemnity and contribution for railroad injuries.
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in dangerous proximity to the track, and created a right to contribution 35
where both parties were actively negligent joint tortfeasors by superceding
the rule embodied in section 102 of the Restatement.36 Thus, under the
majority rule as enunciated in Booth-Kelly, the indemnity clause will apply
in the normal situation where the industry's creation or maintenance of an
unsafe condition and the railroad's routine operation of its train on the
sidetrack combine to produce a compensable injury to a railroad employee. It
is only when the railroad's negligence "actively" concurs with the industry's
negligent act or omission that the more general 37 contribution clause is
brought into play. For example, if defective brakes 38 had prevented Southern
Pacific's train from stopping in time to avoid the accident, or if some
independently negligent conduct on the part of railroad employees39 had
contributed to the injury, the concurrence of Booth-Kelly's negligent creation
of an unsafe condition and the railroad's independent, active negligence
would have triggered the contribution clause.
The analysis underlying the majority view's synthesis of contract
principles and common law indemnity rules appears fundamentally sound,
but it fails adequately to account for one important fact: section 95 of the
Restatement of Restitution - which provides for full indemnity for liability
incurred through a failure to make safe a dangerous condition created by
another - concludes with the proviso that one who is passively or
35. Because this construction modifies the parties' common law rights it is not
subject to the criticism that it effectively deprives the contract of meaning by reading
it as failing to create new rights and duties. Rather, it comports with the common
sense notion that parties do not ordinarily execute contracts to secure the benefits of
the common law. See note 20 supra.
36. It should be noted that the continued vitality of this interpretation is
undermined by the trend toward statutory abolition of the rule stated in § 102. W.
PROSSER, supra note 21, § 50 reports that nine American jurisdictions recognize a
common law right of contribution among joint tortfeasors and that at least 23 others
permit such contribution to a greater or lesser extent by statute. These jurisdictions
are collected and classified in Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in
Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964, 982 (1959). As of 1976, at least 17 states
had adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act. It might,
however, nevertheless be argued that the majority rule interpretation remains
meaningful in that it clarifies the rights of the parties in a particular situation,
thereby creating greater certainty and predictability.
37. The contribution clause may be viewed as being more general in that it was
intended to encompass a broader spectrum of negligence and causation. See generally
note 19 supra.
38. See Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1940)
(discoverable defect in brakes of railroad's car ruled active negligence). The Booth-
Kelly court cited Union Stock Yards as an example of the active negligence that
would trigger the contribution clause.
39. See, e.g., Ratigan v. New York Cent. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1960)
(engineer's "fumbling of instructions" ruled active negligence and a proximate cause
of brakeman's collision with industry's obstruction), aff'd, 291 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1961).
Independent railroad negligence is, by definition, of greater consequence than a mere
failure to warn its employees of a danger created by the negligence of the industry.
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secondarily negligent is entitled to indemnity "unless after discovery of the
danger, he acquiesced in the continuation of the condition."' 4 The Booth-
Kelly opinion deals with the question of the applicability of this qualifica-
tion in a conclusory manner by simply stating that a finding that the
industry was actively, directly, and casually negligent "negatives the
existence of' the railroad's acquiescence. 4 The opinion offers no explana-
tion of why the indemnity clause's enunciation of section 95 was intended to
exclude that section's acquiescence provision, or why such acquiescence by
the railroad would not, on the court's analysis, constitute independent
negligence sufficient to trigger the contribution clause. This is an important
question and one which is at the heart of the departures from the majority
rule discussed in the following section.
42
Another apparent flaw in the majority view arises from the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has seemingly disapproved of the intrusion of
common law principles into the construction of indemnity agreements,
stating that "in the area of contractual indemnity an application of the
theories of 'active' or 'passive' as well as 'primary' or 'secondary' negligence
is inappropriate." 43 This admonition has been adhered to in a number of
cases construing single-clause indemnity contracts to provide for full
indemnity 44 for FELA losses arising out of spur track accidents, 45 but
because the contracts contained only one clause, the central construction
problem of giving meaning and effect to both an indemnity clause and a
contribution clause did not arise. It is only in the context of the potential
ambiguity created by the coexistence of two arguably applicable but
mutually exclusive clauses that the court need look beyond the contract to
common law theories of active and passive negligence. 46 On analysis,
therefore, this shortcoming seems to be more apparent than real.
40. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 95 (1937) (emphasis added).
41. 183 F.2d at 911.
42. See text accompanying notes 78 to 122 infra.
43. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1958).
The fact that Weyerhaeuser was an admiralty case has not been viewed as
significant. See, e.g., cases cited in note 45 infra.
44. See generally note 19 supra.
45. E.g., Seabolt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 1961); Ratigan v.
New York Cent. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 228, 233 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1961). For cases refusing to apply active-passive negligence analysis to dual-clause
contracts, see Miller & Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 328 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1964)
(following Weyerhaeuser without discussion); Anthony v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 316
F.2d 858, 866 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963) (expressly rejecting trial
court's application of active-passive negligence analysis and applying indemnity
clause without a persuasive explanation of the intended application of the
contribution clause); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 193 F. Supp. 471,
479 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962).
46. The Booth-Kelly opinion clearly indicates that the extensive analysis outlined
above would have been unnecessary had the contract consisted of a single indemnity
clause: "If [the contract] contained only that part of the above quoted paragraph
down to the semicolon [the indemnity clause], it would have appeared unquestionably
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From a somewhat different perspective it can be seen that the majority
view, while resorting to common law principles to discern the intent of the
parties and harmonize the indemnity clause with the more general
contribution clause, resists the public policy temptation of either denying
recovery altogether or applying the contribution clause in derogation of the
contract principle that where two mutually exclusive clauses seem to apply,
the more specific prevails over the more general. The trial court in Booth.
Kelly had applied the contribution clause because it found that the railroad
was in some measure also at fault and that this fault contributed to the
accident. On appeal, the industry argued both that the contribution clause,
"in providing that the consequences of liability arising from joint or
concurring negligence shall be borne equally, is an attempt to indemnify
against the consequences of Southern Pacific's own negligence, and is
against public policy and void," 47 and that "a contract of indemnity against
personal injuries, should not be construed to indemnify against the
negligence of the indemnitee [himself] unless such an intention clearly
appears. '48 The court rejected these public policy arguments and proceeded
to determine the intended application of each clause rather than summarily
applying the contribution clause because the railroad was guilty of some
negligence in its violation of the statute. Consistent with basic principles of
contract construction, it read the clauses together in an attempt to gather
the parties' intent from the entire contract and concluded that each clause
was intended to have its own scope:
In approaching the determination of the meaning of this whole
paragraph, it appears to us, initially, that each part of the paragraph
was intended to cover certain kinds or types of cases, and that each part
refers to a situation different from that contemplated by the other. 49
The court's subsequent analysis makes clear its view that the indemnity
clause is the more specific in that it was intended to cover the narrower
situation in which the loss is occasioned primarily by the industry's
negligent creation of an unsafe condition, and that the contribution clause
was intended to apply in situations where causation is broadened by the
existence of significant railroad negligence - such as mechanical defects in
sufficient to require complete indemnity." 183 F.2d at 907. Other cases utilizing active-
passive negligence analysis to reconcile these basic clauses on similar facts include:
Steed v. Central Ry., 529 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962);
Zimmerman v. Timpany, 396 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lehigh Valley R.R. v.
American Smelting and Ref. Co., 256 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Union Camp Corp.
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 130 Ga. App. 113, 202 S.E.2d 508 (1973).
47. 183 F.2d at 911.
48. Id. Although this argument seemed to be directed against the railroad's right
to recovery under either clause of the contract, it is obviously more forceful with
respect to the railroad's right to full recovery under the indemnity clause.
49. Id. at 907.
1978]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
railroad equipment or human error in the operation of trains - which
concurs with the unsafe condition to produce an accident. ° It is only in this
second situation that the parties may be said to be in pari delicto or equally
at fault.
It should also be noted that if a court both follows the view expressed in
the single-clause cases5' that theories of active and passive negligence are
not applicable in contract cases, and views the indemnity clause as being
more specific than the contribution clause, it might construe the contract to
provide an absolute52 right to indemnity on a showing of an industry-created
unsafe condition, despite the presence of the contribution clause and the
concurrence of "active" railroad negligence. 53 The problem with such a
construction is that it would effectively read the contribution clause out of
the contract by allowing full indemnity whenever an industry-created
unsafe condition is a causal factor in the accident, regardless of railroad
negligence. By embracing the active-passive negligence distinction as an
interpretive aid to determining the parties' contractual intent, the majority
view steers a middle course. Its interpretation appears to comport with basic
public policy considerations by maintaining substantial responsibility for
negligent acts without abandoning basic principles of contract construction
or overriding the intent of the parties. Not all courts have exhibited this
retraint.
DEPARTURES FROM THE MAJORITY RuLE
I. Reliance on Train Movement - The Distortion of Active-Passive
Negligence Analysis
There are a number of cases, factually indistinguishable from Booth-
Kelly, which reason from the major premises of the majority view to the
conclusion that it expressly rejects. In Freed v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.,54 the industry's warehouse was serviced by a sidetrack under an
agreement providing for indemnity for losses resulting from the act or
omission of the industry, and contribution for liability arising from the joint
or concurrent negligence of the parties.5 5 The railroad sued the industry to
50. Id. at 907-11.
51. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563
(1958); Seabolt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1961); Ratigan v. New York
Cent. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1961).
52. The right would not be truly absolute because the court would almost
certainly decline to read the contract as providing for indemnity against intentional
torts or losses attributable to willful and wanton misconduct. See, e.g., Palmetto
Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry., 154 S.C. 129, 151 S.E. 279 (1929).
53. See note 44 supra.
54. 401 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1968).
55. "The Industry also agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Railroad
Company for loss, damage or injury from any act or omission of the Industry
or of the licensee, or the employees, agents or servants of either or both of
them, to the persons or property of either of the parties hereto or of the
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recover the balance of a $75,000 settlement which it had paid to a brakeman
who had been injured when he collided with a pile of ice while riding on the
side of a freight car.5 6 The ice, like the cart in Booth-Kelly, had been placed in
dangerous proximity to the track by a person for whom the industry was
responsible under the contract, in this case the industry's lessee. 57
Relying on the principle stated in section 95 of the Restatement of
Restitution,58 the railroad argued that it was at most guilty of passive
negligence for failure to discover or eliminate the dangerous condition, and
that it was therefore entitled to full indemnity under the contract. Rejecting
this argument, the court found that the movement of the train with a
brakeman on the side of the car constituted active negligence which
triggered the contribution clause where, as in Booth-Kelly, the railroad
either knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.59
In comparing the Freed decision with Booth-Kelly it is apparent that,
despite the fact that the operative language of the clauses, the industry's
negligence, and the negligence of the railroad were virtually identical, the
courts reached different conclusions on the basis of their active-passive
negligence analysis. In labeling the railroad's negligence "active," the Freed
court emphasized the fact that the railroad was moving its train at the time
of the accident,6° but this factor certainly cannot distinguish the cases, as
train movement played exactly the same role in the Booth-Kelly accident.61
Similarly, in Dery v. Wyer 62 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the railroad was "concurrently" negligent in moving its train past
a gate post which the industry had placed dangerously close to the side-
track. Although it was undisputed that the industry had created the
dangerous condition, the court nevertheless ruled that the railroad's
operation of its train over the track without having taken steps to correct the
condition constituted negligence which fell within the scope of the
contribution clause of a contract substantially identical to that construed in
Booth-Kelly.63 The railroad's recovery from the industry of amounts paid in
licensee, or any two or more of them, or to the person or property of any other
person or corporation, while on or about said sidetrack; and if any claim or
liability other than from fire shall arise from the joint or concurring
negligence of the parties hereto and the licensee, or of the Railroad Company
and either the Industry or the licensee, it shall be borne equally by the parties
hereto."
Id. at 268-69 (quoting agreement).
56. Id. at 267.
57. Id.
58. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
59. 401 F.2d at 268-69. In Booth-Kelly, the railroad was found to have been
(passively) negligent in failing to remove the cart or to warn its employee of its
presence. 183 F.2d at 910-11.
60. 401 F.2d at 268.
61. 183 F.2d at 904.
62. 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
63. "The Industry also agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Railroad
Company for loss, damage, or injury from any act or omission of the Industry
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satisfaction of its FELA liability to the estate of a brakeman who had been
killed when he collided with the post and was knocked from the side of a
moving freight car was therefore limited to contribution. 64 The court deemed
it unnecessary to hold specifically that the railroad's negligence was active,
but it stated that the railroad's negligence was no less active than that of
the industry, in effect ruling that the parties were in pari delicto.65
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result on
similar facts in Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Central Railway.66 In that case a
railroad employee was injured when he stepped from a moving train onto an
industry loading platform which was littered with debris. The contract
under which the sidetrack was furnished and maintained provided for
indemnity or contribution in language substantially identical to that applied
in Booth-Kelly, Dery, and Freed.67 The Colonial Stores court, like the courts
in Dery and Freed, limited the railroad's recovery in accordance with the
contribution clause.6 8 It concluded that the railroad was concurrently
negligent in permitting the accumulation of debris and in requiring or
permitting its employee to step from its moving train onto a platform which
it knew or should have known to be unsafe, without warning him of the
danger.
-. .to the person or property of the parties hereto ... while on or about said
side track and switch connection; and if any claim or liability other than from
fire shall arise from the joint or concurring negligence of both parties hereto
* . .it shall be borne equally by the Industry and the Rail Road Company."
Id. at 809 n.6 (quoting agreement). The language of this agreement is almost identical
to that of the Booth-Kelly agreement, quoted in text accompanying notes 23 & 24
supra.
64. Id. at 810. In a rather puzzling discussion, the opinion seemed to rely on the
parties' having been in pari delicto as a prerequisite to application of the contribution
clause; however, the court also indicated that the contribution clause was sufficiently
clear to require contribution in circumstances in which the common law would permit
indemnity. Id. This suggests that the contract was intended to secure additional
rights for the industry rather than the railroad, a proposition that must be viewed
with skepticism. See note 19 supra and text accompanying note 33 supra.
65. 265 F.2d at 810.
66. 279 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1960).
67. "The Tenant [Colonial] also agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the
Railway [Central] from loss, damage or injury from any act or omission of the
Tenant. . . to the person or property of the parties hereto and their employees
• . .while on or about said tracks; and if any claim or liability other than
from fire shall arise from the joint or concurring negligence of the parties
hereto, it shall be borne equally by them."
Id. at 778 (quoting agreement).
68. Id. at 778-80. The court expressly affirmed the trial court's finding that the
railroad's negligence was "active and primary," but also dismissed the railroad's
contention that its negligence was merely passive as being inapplicable in cases
where the injured employee is an invitee rather than a licensee. Id. This one-sentence
"argument" was neither explained nor related to the construction of the contract.
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In Spielman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,6 9 a railroad
employee was injured when he was knocked from the side of a moving
freight car by a post which had been erected dangerously close to the spur
track. The jury found that the industry was negligent in creating the
dangerous condition and that the railroad was negligent under the FELA in
failing to warn its employee of the industry-created condition.70 In holding
that the contribution clause controlled on these facts, the court expressly
rejected the railroad's argument that it was only passively negligent in
failing to warn its employee, stating that:
Negligence is both positive and negative in character, and may
consist of acts of commission or omission or both. However, acts of
commission or omission are not divided, respectively, into the categories
of active and passive negligence, inasmuch as both types of fault may
constitute active negligence.
If the Railroad Company failed to warn plaintiff of such a
condition on its own premises, it would be actively negligent, owing to
the fact that it was operating the train at the time. Surely the Railroad's
entrance upon [the industry's] premises, over which it had a right of
way, did not transform its actions into passive negligence.71
A possible rationale of these unorthodox active-passive negligence
classifications was articulated by Judge Van Pelt in his dissenting opinion
in Anthony v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway.72 In that case a railroad
employee was injured while riding on the side of a train when he collided
with a shed which a lumber company had erected close to the track in
violation of a clearance agreement.73 Theorizing that passive negligence
entails the creation of a hazardous condition while active negligence
consists in negligent action upon that condition, the dissenting opinion
reasoned that
the one who brought about the condition in the instant case was the
shipper who built the shed in violation of the clearance requirement and
that the one who acted upon the condition was the railroad in moving
cars over the track. Without the movement of the cars I conclude that
Cloudy would not have been injured.7 4
Although this conceptualization of passive and active negligence is
perhaps as semantically plausible as the more generally accepted contrary
69. 147 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
70. Id. at 452.
71. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
72. 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963); (Van Pelt, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 860, 863.
74. Id. at 867.
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formulation implicit in the majority view,7 5 it is far less likely to reflect the
contractual intent of the parties. At the time of the accident, it is of course
true that the railroad's train is moving or "acting upon" a previously created
condition which is in some sense "passive"; but because the operation of
trains over the sidetrack will almost inevitably be a factor when the
industry's creation of an unsafe condition results in the losses contemplated
by the agreement, a definition of active negligence founded upon train
movement and the presence of an unsafe condition can be of little value in
interpreting the contract. If the movement of railroad cars over a track
rendered unsafe by an industry's act or omission is action upon an unsafe
condition which is, l y definition, active negligence triggering the contribu-
tion clause, there can be almost no case in which the railroad is both liable
to its employee under the statute and entitled to full indemnity under the
contract which was executed to protect the railroad against statutory
liability. Because it results in the automatic application of the contribution
clause, this active-passive negligence analysis effectively reads the indem-
nity clause out of the agreement and is therefore subject to the very
objections which prompted the majority view, as typified by Booth-Kelly, to
resort to common law theories of active and passive negligence in the first
instance. It fails to give meaning and effect to both clauses and conflicts
with the presumption that the agreement was executed for the benefit of the
railroad, to protect it against the forseeable risks incident to its furnishing of
the spur track.7 6 The fact that some of the opinions which rely on train
movement to characterize the railroad's negligence as "active" also rely on
failure to warn is of little significance because such a failure is also a
constant factor, one which tends to make the movement of the train
negligent.
The foregoing cases illustrate the manner in which the tendency to
associate active negligence with movement can be combined with the notion
that negligence may consist of "acts" of omission (such as a failure to warn)
to characterize as active, negligence which is considered passive under the
majority view. A number of cases focus on the "acts of omission" aspect of
this conception of active negligence, recognizing it under the rubric of the
separate defense of "acquiescence."
II. Acquiescence as Active Negligence or Waiver
As previously mentioned, section 95 of the Restatement of Restitution
provides that a prRn incurrng -Va iy because of the negligent failure to
make safe a dangerous condition created by another is entitled to indemnity
unless after discovery of the danger, he acquiesced in the continuation of the
75. See text accompanying notes 34 to 39 supra.
76. It appears that the inclusion of the contribution clause evolved as an attempt
to mitigate the harsh consequences of single-clause full-indemnity agreements in the
unusual situation where the railroad's negligence was substantial, sufficiently
distinct from the unsafe condition, and outside the realm of normal railroad
operations. See note 19 supra.
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condition. 77 The cases holding that the railroad's acquiescence 8 in a
dangerous condition triggers the contribution clause do so on the basis of
two closely related theories. Acquiescence is viewed as either a species of
active negligence that is affirmatively controlled by the contribution clause
or as an implied waiver of the right to rely on the indemnity clause which
leaves the contribution clause to govern the rights of the parties. These two
conceptualizations are (at least theoretically) distinguishable from each
other and from the convoluted active-passive negligence analysis discussed
above, although the three concepts tend to overlap in their application. The
concept of acquiescence does not rely or focus on train movement in order to
characterize the railroad's negligent failure to act as "active." Cases which
approach the railroad's failure to act in the face of an industry-created
danger from an acquiescence perspective require that the railroad have had
actual knowledge of the danger, as one obviously cannot acquiesce in a
condition without being aware of it. This is true whether the court
emphasizes the implied waiver, or the active negligence aspect of acquies-
cence. In contrast, the cases focusing on the element of train movement do
not require actual knowledge as prerequisite to a finding of active
negligence, but deny indemnity where the railroad either knew, or should
have known of the danger. 79 Moreover, it is often stated that "bare
knowledge" alone is insufficient to uphold the acquiescence defense to full
indemnity; "[alnother, more general requirement is that the indemnitee's
conduct be so seriously wrongful as to make full restitution inequitable." s
These distinctions, though subtle, become meaningful in several of the cases
and provide some insight into the rationales of various decisions applying
the contribution clause.
A. Acquiescence in the Dual-Clause Agreements
In Emonz v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad l a New
York state court held that the railroad's right to recovery under the Booth-
77. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 95 (1937).
78. There is no settled judicial definition of the term "acquiescence" but one court
has stated that, basically,
the concept covers comprehensively a variety of situations in which courts
think that a party should be denied indemnity because his own conduct has
been so blameworthy and has so contributed to the harm in question that full
restitution is inequitable or cannot properly be viewed as within the intended
coverage of an agreement to indemnify.
One hallmark of such acquiescence is long continued awareness of a
dangerous situation by the indemnitee without either taking any corrective
measure or calling upon the indemnitor to do so.
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 848 (3d Cir. 1962).
79. See text accompanying notes 54 to 68 supra.
80. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Rental Storage and Transit Co., 524 S.W.2d 898, 911 (Mo.
App. 1975). See also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d
Cir. 1962), quoted at note 78 supra.
81. 42 Misc. 2d 957, 249 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Kelly contract was governed by the contribution clause where the railroad
had actual knowledge of an unsafe condition created by the industry on the
sidetrack. The court stated that "[t]he knowledge of the defendant [railroad]
of this dangerous condition and its failure to correct it or to direct the third-
party defendant [industry] to correct it makes the defendant equally
responsible with the third-party defendant ".,82 and characterized the
railroad's negligence as active.8 3
In Rouse v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad,8 4 the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was confronted with a dual-clause agreement
which expressly stipulated that the railroad would be entitled to full
indemnity for losses resulting from unsafe clearances.8 5 Despite the fact that
the injury resulted from an unsafe clearance, the court construed the
contract to provide for contribution because the railroad had acquiesced in
the danger. In contrast to Emonz, the Rouse court did not feel compelled to
characterize the railroad's acquiescence as active negligence. In an opinion
that suggests reliance on a theory of implied waiver, the court merely stated
that the defense of acquiescence served to bring the contribution clause into
play, limiting the industry's contractual liability to fifty percent of the
verdict against the railroad.8 6
B. Acquiescence in the Three-Clause Agreements
The defense of acquiescence is often raised when, in addition to the two
standard clauses discussed above, the indemnity agreement contains a third
and presumably unambiguous clause which provides that the industry will
hold the railroad harmless for injuries resulting from reduced clearances.
The addition of this third clause tends to focus the conflict between the
majority view's reliance on contract principles and the reliance on public
policy exhibited by the departures from the majority view, because the
specificity of the additional language appears to eliminate the ambiguity
which arguably justifies policy-oriented construction in the first instance.
82. Id. at 961, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
83. Id. See also Southern Ry. v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1967)
(equating knowledge of dangerous condition coupled with failure to alleviate it with
active negligence and denying full indemnity for FELA loss).
84. 474 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1973).
85. The court described the agreement as follows:
should the [industry] fail to observe clearance requirements it "will assume all
liability therefor and agrees to indemnify and save harmless the [railroad]
... against any and all claims for loss, damage, injury or death resulting
therefrom." A general provision of the lease further provided for indemnity for
claims arising out of injury or death of the parties and their employees or
other persons while on or about the leased premises and stipulated that "if
any claim or liability due to some other cause than fire shall result from thejoint or concurring negligence of both parties hereto it shall be borne by them
equally."
id. at 1182 (quoting agreement).
86. Id. at 1184.
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When the contract is unambiguous there is no need to resort to the common
law doctrine of acquiescence and little justification for disregarding an
express contractual right. A number of cases have nevertheless declined to
apply the additional indemnity clause, demonstrating the lengths to which
some courts have been willing to go in injecting policy considerations into
contract construction.
Perhaps the most instructive analysis of the application of the
acquiescence doctrine to three-clause spur track agreements was framed in
the trial and appellate court opinions issued in Pennsylvania Railroad v.
Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 7 a case in which a brakeman had been killed
when he was crushed between a moving train and the warehouse company's
retaining wall. The indemnity agreement dealt specifically with this
situation in a third indemnity clause which provided that
[t]he Industry shall at all times hereafter establish and maintain on its
property a clear and safe space above and on each side of the side track
sufficient to insure the safety of employees and equipment of the
Railroad Company, and the Industry shall indemnify and save
harmless the Railroad Company from loss, damage, and expense for
failure so to do.88
The district court found that the railroad had acquiesced in the
dangerous condition but concluded that acquiescence is no defense where
there is an "express" indemnity provision.89 Its opinion argued persuasively
that the defense of acquiescence simply has no application to indemnity
rights claimed under contract, at least not when the contract specifically
refers to the type of condition which causes the accident and resulting loss.9°
In essence, the lower court's ruling was predicated on both the principle that
acquiescence is no defense to the terms of a contract, and the conclusion
that, in any event, neither the Restatement in general nor sections 95 and
102 in particular purports to describe rights arising out of the breach of an
indemnity contract.91 After deciding that the agreement had to be viewed
from a pure contract perspective without resorting to common law principles
87. 193 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962).
88. 302 F.2d at 846 n.2.
89. 193 F. Supp. at 479.
90. Id. at 480.
91. Both the General Scope Note to the RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION, at 1-3,
and the Introductory Note to Topic 3, which includes sections 95 and 102, at 327-31,
make clear that the RESTATEMENT is not concerned with rights arising upon breach of
an express contract. The General Scope Note contains this language at page 2: "The
restitutionary rights which arise upon the breach or non-performance of a contract
and those which arise from the performance or non-performance of a trust are
included only by cross-reference to The Restatements of Contracts and Trusts, except
where a constructive trust arises." The Introductory Note uses these words at page
329: "The Restatement of this Subject does not deal with liability based solely upon
breach of contract . . .nor with the measure of damages arising therefrom." 193 F.
Supp. at 480.
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which might otherwise be used to resolve the more substantial ambiguity
generated in a dual-clause contract, the trial court had little difficulty in
concluding that the three-clause contract provided for full indemnity on
these facts.
Although the trial court's conclusion was firmly rejected on appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit qualified its holding that the defense
of acquiescence applies to contractual, as well as common law, indemnity
rights by requiring that the fault of the railroad be both "blameworthy" and
"sufficiently distinct from" that of the industry. 92 In the course of its
analysis the reviewing court frankly acknowledged the public policy
implications of the acquiescence doctrine, stating:
Basically, we think the concept covers comprehensively a variety of
situations in which courts think that a party should be denied
indemnity because his owzi conduct has been so blameworthy and has
so contributed to the harm in question that full restitution is inequitable
or cannot properly be viewed as within the intended coverage of an
agreement to indemnify.93
The opinion also relied on the policy considerations implicit in the fact that
"the Pennsylvania cases repeatedly express the reluctance of the courts of
that state to read indemnity contracts as intended to protect the indemnitee
from loss attributable to his own blameworthy conduct" 94 to support its
construction of the agreement.
In its application of this analysis, the court emphasized the fact that the
railroad had received a conductor's report warning that the hazards on the
siding were such that cars should be moved only in daylight but continued
to conduct switching operations at night, at times with personnel who were
unfamiliar with the sidetrack. The industry's liability was limited to
contribution.95
92. 302 F.2d at 849. Accord, Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Winburn Tile Mfg. Co., 461 F.2d
984 (8th Cir. 1972) (railroad's acquiescence in shipper's negligent maintenance of gate
across sidetrack not sufficiently distinct from shipper's negligence and not serious
enough to warrant defense of acquiescence; liability assessed under contribution
clause).
93. 302 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 849.
95. Although the opinion appears to analyze the case in terms of acquiescence as
implied waiver without labeling the railroad's negligence "active," its analysis is
consistent with a finding that the railroad's negligence was active:
Although the fault of the railroad was serious enough and sufficiently
distinct from Erie's fault to preclude the railroad from recovering full
indemnity from Erie, the combination of distinct blameworthy acts and
omissions of the two parties brought the case within the provision of
paragraph 9 [contribution clause] of the siding agreement that the parties
shall bear equally liabilility arising from their joint or concurring negligence.
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In Pennsylvania Railroad v. M.K. W. Corp.96 the contribution clause was
applied to limit the railroad's recovery for losses arising out of the death of a
railroad employee who was crushed between a moving train and the
industry's gate which encroached upon safe clearances. In addition to the
standard indemnity and contribution clauses, the contract again contained
a provision requiring the industry to establish and maintain safe clearances
and to "indemnify and save harmless the Railroad Company from loss,
damage and expense for failure so to do."'97 In analyzing the agreement, the
court started from the well-settled premise that contracts of indemnity shall
not be construed to indemnify against the negligence of the indemnitee
unless such an intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms. 98 After
finding that the railroad's knowledge of the unsafe clearance constituted
acquiescence 99 which would bar full recovery absent a definite provision of
nonliability for negligence, 1°° the M.K.W. court applied the contribution
clause but failed to explain why the unsafe clearance indemnity clause was
not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to create an express contract right to
indemnity in these circumstances. At one point in the opinion the court
appears to have relied on the acquiescence as active negligence principle,
characterizing the railroad's continued use of the unsafe sidetrack as "an
absolute failure to maintain that standard of care necessary to insure the
reasonable safety of its employees." 101 In the following paragraph, however,
the opinion suggests additional reliance upon an implied waiver (of the
contractual right to full indemnity) analysis: "The Railroad, clearly aware of
the possiblity of serious injury to its employees, by its continued operation
contributed to the negligent acts of [the] Industry and gave its assent to the
increased possibility of injury.' 10 2
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Missouri Pacific
Railroad v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.,' 0 3 relied more heavily upon the
implied waiver theory of acquiescence in holding that acquiescence is a
defense to a claim for full indemnity under a three-clause agreement. The
district court had rejected as immaterial, evidence which tended to show
acquiescence by the railroad in the continuation of the reduced clearance
created by the industry's protruding loading dock. 04 Despite the fact that
the indemnity contract provided both that the industry "indemnify and hold
harmless" the railroad against any damages arising out of the industry's
failure to maintain the agreed upon track clearances,'05 and that the
industry waived all rights to question the railroad's right or power to enforce
96. 301 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
97. Id. at 992.
98. Id. at 994 (applying Ohio law).
99. Id. at 995.
100. Id. at 944-95.
101. Id. at 995.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. 434 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 577.
105. Id.
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this indemnity provision;10 6 the court of appeals ruled that the railroad's
right to full indemnity was limited by section 95's common law acquiescence
doctrine. In holding that the district court's failure to admit evidence of the
railroad's acquiescence in the unsafe clearance was erroneous, the opinion
reasoned that the common law doctrine of acquiescence constitutes a
defense to a contractual claim for indemnity unless the parties expressly
contract against its application. 107 Moreover, the court refused to read the
industry's express waiver of the right to question the railroad's right to
enforce the clearance-violation indemnity clause as a contractual provision
against the common law acquiescence defense, 08 citing the general rule
against construing indemnity agreements to permit the indemnitee to
recover for its own negligence unless the court is firmly convinced that such
was the intent of the parties. 10 9 In a closing paragraph the court observed
that, although the question was not then before it, the industry's success in
establishing an acquiescence defense also establishes its own joint or
concurring negligence within the meaning of the contribution clause." 0 This
final comment makes clear the court's view that the industry need not itself
be free from fault in order to argue successfully that, in acquiescing in the
unsafe condition, the railroad has in effect waived (or is estopped from
asserting) its claim for full indemnity under a specific contractual provision.
The cases which view the acquiescence issue from a strict contract
perspective, on the other hand, analyze the effect of the railroad's failure to
act independently from the common law concept of acquiescence, in terms of
the contract doctrines of estoppel and waiver. In Boston & Maine Railroad v.
Howard Hardware Co.," it was held reversible error to submit the defense
of acquiescence to the jury even though the railroad had known of the
inadequate clearance for many years and was further aware that railroad
cars had on several previous occasions struck the side of the building
against which its brakeman was crushed. The court ruled that the very
purpose of the three-clause indemnity agreement was to transfer the risk of
liability in such situations from the railroad to the industry and declined to
apply the contribution clause in spite of the railroad's continued acquies-
cence in an obviously dangerous condition. 112 The Howard Hardware court
106. Id. at 579.
107. Id.
108. Id. The opinion distinguished an earlier Eighth Circuit case which had held
that the following language was sufficiently clear and unambiguous to preclude the
assertion of an acquiescence defense: "'Carrier's knowledge of such obstructions and
its continued operation of the Switch shall not be a waiver of this covenant, nor of the
Carrier's right to recover for such damages to persons or property as may result
therefrom.'" Id. at 578 (quoting Anthony v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 316 F.2d 858,
862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963)).
109. Id. at 579.
110. Id. at 581.
111. 123 Vt. 203, 186 A.2d 184 (1962). See also New York Cent. R.R. v. General
Motors Corp., 182 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
112. 123 Vt. at 211, 186 A.2d at 191.
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in effect ruled that the specific clause entitling the railroad to indemnity for
damages caused by industry-created unsafe clearances 13 placed the
industry in the position of an insurer with respect to accidents caused by
unsafe clearances." 4 In rejecting the industry's section 95 acquiescence
argument, the opinion cited Williston on Contracts for the proposition that
"[t]he fundamental basis for estoppel in the law of contracts is the
justification for the conduct of the party claiming it.''" s Consistent with this
contract-oriented approach, the court concluded that the unsafe clearance
indemnity clause must prevail over the more general contribution clause,
relying on Booth-Kelly and secondary contract sources as authority:
The second section of provision 7 [contribution clause] is general in
its application. It was designed to cover accidents that might occur on
the siding from unspecified causes where joint and concurring
negligence of the railroad and the shipper might be involved. Paragraph
8 [third, unsafe clearance indemnity clause] is specific and is confined to
instances where liability arises from obstructions to passage along the
railroad siding. It relates directly to accidents of the type that is
involved in this controversy. Since it appears that the purpose of
paragraph 8 was directed particularly to accidents produced by
obstructions, it must prevail over the general terms of the preceding
clause. Deep Vein Coal Co. v. Chicago & E.I. Rwy. Co., 7 Cir., 71 F.2d
963, 964; Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Company, supra,
183 F.2d at page 906, 20 A.L.R.2d at 703; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 313, p.
731; 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, § 244, p. 779.H1 6
Similarly, Lehigh Valley Railroad v. American Smelting and Refining
Co.,1 7 rejected the application of an acquiescence defense to a three-clause
agreement, holding that the industry had "contracted away its right to rely
on the doctrine of acquiescence" where the agreement appeared to
contemplate the existence of the close clearance which resulted in the death
of a railroad employee."18 The court found that the railroad was guilty only
of passive negligence in conducting operations with knowledge of the
113. "8. No obstruction of any kind whatsoever shall be permitted within the
distances shown by the lines of the Clearance Diagram upon this agreement
without first obtaining the consent of the Chief Engineer of the Railroad and
the Shipper shall at all times save harmless and indemnify the Railroad from
and against all loss, cost, damage and expense which the Railroad may
directly or indirectly suffer or be subject to caused wholly or in part or in any
way referable to the existence of such obstruction, whether with or without the
consent of the Chief Engineer."
Id. at 205, 186 A.2d at 187 (quoting agreement).
114. See id. at 211, 186 A.2d at 188.
115. Id. at 211, 186 A.2d at 191 (citing 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 692, at 1998
(rev. ed. 1936)) (emphasis added).
116. 123 Vt. at 213, 186 A.2d at 192.
117. 256 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
118. Id. at 537.
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dangerous condition, 119 and reasoned that application of the acquiescence
defense in such circumstances would effectively nullify the close clearance
indemnity clause because "[t]he Railroad would never be able to recover
except possibly where the third-party defendant [industry] suddenly erected
a new structure close to the tracks and the Railroad had not as yet had an
opportunity to object before the accident."' 12 On this analysis, the opinion
plausibly concluded that the parties could not have intended the railroad's
acquiescence to defeat its contractual claim for indemnity.
Because they construe contracts which contain a third clause that seems
to remove the apparent ambiguity generated by the dual-clause agreements,
the Howard Hardware and American Smelting cases bring the general
(contract) analysis of why the doctrine of acquiescence is insufficient to
defeat a contractual claim of indemnity into sharp focus: the industry, in
every case, is seriously at fault in creating the dangerous condition and
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim an estoppel against the railroad.
Where the indemnity clause or clauses either expressly or by fair implication
contemplate the accident which results in the Loss, it is unlikely that the
parties intended that a mere failure to act to correct the unsafe condition
would defeat the right to indemnity created by the contract - if the parties
did intend such an extreme result they could have included a provision to
that effect in their contract.
The contract-oriented three-clause cases do not, however, adequately
explain the intent underlying the more general indemnity and contribution
clauses. It would appear that the unsafe clearance clause was intended to
provide an absolute right to indemnity for losses occasioned by unsafe
clearances, while the remaining clauses were intended to cover injuries
arising out of other unsafe conditions created by the industry. 12' Not all
cases have construed three-clause contracts in this manner, 22 however, and
it can be argued that the analysis described above results in a construction
which severely limits the application of the contribution clause. Because
nearly all of the accidents contemplated by sidetrack indemnity agreements
are caused by unsafe clearances, the contribution clause is applicable under
this construction only when the accident is caused by an unusual
occurrence, and then only in the unusual situation in which the railroad's
negligence can be deemed primary or active. The issue of the scope and
application of each of the clauses in a three-clause agreement is puzzling
and no decision has carefully analyzed the question, but the possibility that
the parties simply bargained for clauses which appeared favorable
individually without fully considering their concurrent effect should not be
overlooked.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 538.
121. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
122. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 434 F.2d 575 (8th
Cir. 1970); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. M.K.W. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
[VOL. 38
CONSTRUCTION OF INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT AROUND THE RECONCILIATION OF CLAUSES
PROBLEM TO ACHIEVE A PARTICULAR RESULT
The construction issues discussed thus far are ultimately a reflection of
the principle that although public policy does not flatly prohibit a railroad's
utilization of a spur track agreement to shift the burden of liability which
arises in whole or in part from its own negligence, such agreements will not
be construed to permit the railroad to recover losses attributable to its FELA
negligence unless the court is "firmly convinced" that such a construction
reflects the intention of the parties. The construction problems previously
described stem from the wider problem of drafting an unequivocal
expression of intent within the framework of a multi-clause agreement that
will provide for indemnity in some instances and contribution in others. The
problem is, of course, complicated by the fact that courts must be firmly
convinced of the parties' intention that the railroad be fully indemnified for
its FELA liability in a legal atmosphere influenced, to varying degrees, by
policy considerations which suggest that the railroad's recovery be limited
to contribution. The task is not, however, impossible, even in the most
policy-oriented jurisdictions.
In single-clause agreements the problem of drafting an unequivocal
expression of intent can be bluntly disposed of through explicit reference to
the negligence of the indemnitee. 123 The phrase "regardless of any
negligence or alleged negligence on the part of any employee of the
Railroad" passed muster in Western Constructors v. Southern Pacific Co.,124
as did "notwithstanding any possible negligence (whether sole, concurrent
or otherwise) on the part of [the Railroad], its agents or employs" in
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Rental Storage and Transit Co. 125 Such a
drafting strategy would, in essence, create a contract of insurance which
would withstand attacks on public policy grounds in nearly all jurisdic-
tions 26 by virtue of its clear and unequivocal expression of intent that the
railroad be indemnified for the consequences of its own negligence. Single-
clause contracts preceded the development of the two and three-clause
agreements 127 which, through the contribution clause, tend to protect the
industry in situations where the railroad is seriously at fault. Such
protection can be dispensed with effectively by restricting the contract to a
single explicit indemnity clause.
123. In United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 n.15 (1970), the Supreme
Court outlined the two prevailing views among the states concerning clarity of
expression. One requires an explicit reference to the indemnitee's negligence, and the
other dispenses with this requirement when the intention to indemnify the indemnitee
for his own negligence otherwise appears with sufficient clarity. See generally Annot.,
175 A.L.R. 8 (1948). See also note 18 supra.
124. 381 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1967).
125. 524 S.W.2d 898, 908 (Mo. App. 1975) (emphasis, parentheses, and brackets in
original).
126. See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 (1970).
127. See note 19 supra.
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Where the parties desire to afford the industry some protection by
combining indemnity and contribution clauses, the draftsman's task is to
indicate clearly the relative scope of each of the clauses and to provide for
the contingency of an acquiescence defense which would deprive the
railroad of its right to indemnity. The spur track agreement in Missouri
Pacific Railroad v. Winburn Manufacturing Co.128 is noteworthy because it
combined an explicit reference to the railroad's negligence with a clearly
drafted limitation on the scope of the contribution clause to express
forcefully the intention that the industry hold the railroad harmless for all
losses arising from unsafe clearances in a dual-clause agreement. The clause
requiring the industry to indemnify the railroad for losses attributable to
unsafe clearances concluded with the words "notwithstanding any possible
negligence (whether sole, concurrent or otherwise) on the part of the Carrier,
its agents or employees,"'1 29 and the joint or concurring negligence-
contribution clause was preceded by the phrase "except as otherwise
provided in this agreement."'130 This formulation enabled the railroad to
recover its entire loss despite the fact that the injury to a railroad switchman
was caused by the industry's clearance violation and the concurrence of the
railroad's active negligence, as a lower court decision applying the
contribution clause was reversed.' 3 ' By making clear that the indemnity
clause applied specifically to losses occasioned by unsafe clearances
regardless of railroad negligence through an express reference to such
negligence and a clear limitation on the scope of the contribution clause, the
contract removed all ambiguity regarding indemnification for the most
common class of accidents. On balance, the drafting technique illustrated in
Winburn Manufacturing increases the indemnity rights of the railroad over
those accruing under the basic dual-clause agreement as construed in
majority view cases such as Booth-Kelly. More importantly from the
railroad's perspective, it affords protection against the policy-oriented
constructions of the standard two-clause agreement found in cases such as
Freed v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,1 32 Dery v. Wyer, 33 and Colonial Stores,
Inc. v. Central Railway,3 4 discussed previously. 135
In Ruddy v. New York Central Railroad 36 it was held that a safe
clearance indemnity clause controlled "despite the presence of the railroad's
active negligence and the absence of exact words to void such negli-
128. 461 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1972),
129. Id. at 986.
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 988-89.
132. 401 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1968).
133. 265 Fo2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
134. 279 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1960).
135. See text accompanying notes 54 to 76 supra.
136. 124 F. Supp. 470 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), modified on other grounds, 224 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1955).
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gence." 137 Noting that the contribution clause followed the phrase "except as
herein otherwise specifically provided," 13 the court pointedly stated that
[t]o overlook this important exception and read this general paragraph
with the particular and definite paragraph would be a strained meshing
and directly against the express words in [clearance indemnity clause]
"to assume and indemnify and hold harmless. 139
By inserting the words "except as herein otherwise specifically provided,"
the draftsman of the contract was able to prevent the application of the
contribution clause in a situation where the dual-clause contract contem-
plated full indemnity. This result would have followed from neutral
principles of contract construction as applied to the standard dual-clause
agreement - both because the more specific indemnity clause should prevail
over the more general contribution clause and for the related reason that the
application of the more general clause when the more specific one seems to
apply inevitably reads the more specific clause out of the contract by failing
to give it meaning and effect - but the added language expressly indicates
the relative scope of the clauses and eliminates the possibility of the
contrary result produced by a departure from such principles. Some courts
have applied the contribution clause despite the fact that a more specific
indemnity clause seems to apply. 140 The drafting employed in Ruddy is
calculated to defeat such constructions.
Problems posed by the waiver or estoppel element of the acquiescence
doctrine can usually be avoided by including a nonwaiver provision such
as: "Neither the Railway Company's knowledge or notice of any such non-
observance, nor its failure to notify its employees thereof, nor its continued
operation of said spur tracks, shall be in any wise deemed a waiver of the
foregoing covenant of indemnity."141 Such nonwaiver provisions would also
seem to provide strong, if indirect, support for an argument against the
application of the contribution clause under an expansive active negligence
theory.142
137. Id. at 474.
138. Id. at 473. (quoting contract).
139. Id. at 475. Accord, Gollick v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 138 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Mich.
1956).
140. See text accompanying notes 54 to 101 supra.
141. Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 199 F.2d 725, 729
(8th Cir. 1952) (full indemnity awarded where railroad employee was injured due to
unsafe clearance despite industry's arguments based on railroad's passing of cars
along track after learning of danger). See also Miller and Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
328 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1974); Anthony v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 316 F.2d 858, 862- 63
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963). But see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Arkansas
Oak Flooring Co., 434 F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying contribution clause
despite nonwaiver provision stating that either party "may waive any default at any
time of the other without affecting, or impairing any right arising from any
subsequent default," on the ground that the provision did not unequivocally express
an intent to indemnify against own negligence).
142. See text accompanying notes 55 to 72 supra.
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Although the various drafting strategies discussed above do not all
produce the same rights and liabilities as do the majority rule construction
of the basic two-clause agreement interpreted in Booth-Kelly or the contract-
oriented constructions of the three-clause agreements, 143 they all illustrate
ways in which the parties, particularly the railroad, can shield themselves
from policy-oriented construction of their contracts. While it is thus clear
that policy-oriented construction can be avoided through careful (albeit
strongly worded) draftsmanship, it is equally clear that the justifications
underlying the policy-oriented departures from more neutral principles of
contract construction, which sometimes necessitate such exacting drafts-
manship, need to be articulated carefully and examined closely. The fact
that the departures can be "drafted around" does not, of course, provide any
justification for their existence. Their justification must be found in the
policy interests they ostensibly promote.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
I. Construction in Light of the Purpose and Intent of the FELA
Two basic themes permeate the various descriptions of the legislative
intent of the Federal Employers Liability Act. First, the Act was intended to
require the railroad industry to internalize some of the cost of railroad
injuries and thereby "lift from employees the 'prodigious burden' of personal
injuries which that system had placed upon them."'144 Second, it was
designed to promote railroad safety.145
143. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley R.R. v. American Smelting Co., 256 F. Supp. 534 (E.D.
Pa. 1966); Boston & M.R.R. v. Howard Hardware Co., 123 Vt. 203, 186 A.2d 184 (1962).
These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 111 to 122 supra.
144. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). The
legislative history of the Act contains the following explanation of this element of its
purpose:
The passage of the original act and the perfection thereof by the
amendments herein proposed, stand forth as a declaration of public policy to
change radically, as far as congressional power can extend, those rules of the
common law which the president, in a recent speech at Chicago, characterized
as "unjust." President Taft, in his address at Chicago, September 16, 1909,
referred "to the continuance of unjust rules of law exempting employers from
liability for accidents." The public policy which we now declare is based upon
the failure of the common law to meet the modern industrial conditions, and is
based not alone upon the failure of those who are in the United States, but
their failure in other countries as well. Mr. Asquith, present Prime Minister of
England, said that it was "revolting to sentiment and judgment that men who
met with accidents through the necessary exigencies of daily occupation,
should be a charge upon their own families."
S. REP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910).
145. In Saint Louis, Iron Mt. & S. Ry. v. Conley, 187 F. 949, 952 (8th Cir. 1911), the
Eighth Circuit stated that "[tihe primary object of the act was to promote the safety of
employbs of railroads ...." Similarly, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in
Wilkerson stated that the Act was intended to abolish the common law defenses of
assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and contributory negligence which often
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As a prophylactic measure, section 55 of the Act broadly proscribes
contractual exemption from FELA liability: "Any contract, rule regulation,
or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter,
shall to that extent be void .... ,,146 This provision seems to be suceptible to
an expansive reading on the basis of its broad language and apparent
intention that the railroad bear the burden of FELA liability. It has been
uniformly held, however, that the concern of section 55 was to ensure that
railroad employees be compensated to the full extent of their loss, not that
the railroad be precluded from indemnifying itself against FELA liability. 147
It is clear that section 55 was directed at the particular problem of employer-
employee releases and was not enacted to prevent carriers from shifting the
insulated the railroad from liability arising from unsafe working conditions, and to
thereby protect railroad employees from the "risks and hazards which could be
avoided or lessened by the exercise of proper care on the part of the employer in
providing safe and proper machinery and equipment with which the employee does
his work." Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (quoting from H.R. REP. No.
1386, 60th Cong., 1st Seas. 2 (1908)) (emphasis added).
146. 45 U.S.C. §55 (1970).
147. E.g., Hall v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 322 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1971). An
important distinction has been drawn between indemnity for liability incurred, and
exemption from liability in the first instance:
It is suggested that the so-called indemnity clause of the Protective Service
Contract amounts to a violation of [45 U.S.C. § 55]. But inasmuch as this
clause is one merely of indemnity, it does not have the effect of exempting the
railroads from their liability as common carriers under the Act. Hence in no
sense may it be considered a violation of [§ 55].
Gaulden v. Southern Pac. Co., 78 F. Supp. 651,655-56 (N.D. Cal. 1948), affl'd, 174 F.2d
1022 (9th Cir. 1949).
This distinction figured prominently in Culmer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 1
F.R.D. 765 (W.D. Pa. 1941), Where a brakeman had been injured because of the
insufficient clearance between the train on which he was riding and the industry's
building. The court expressly rejected the industry's § 55 defense to the railroad's
indemnity claim on the basis of its conclusion that § 55 contemplates agreements
between employer and employee, and not agreements with third parties. Id. at 766. A
similar result obtained in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 205 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1953), an action by a railroad to recover from circus owners under an indemnity
agreement providing for liability arising in the course of haulage of the circus' train
over the railroad's line. The court held that the railroad could sue on the contract for
injuries to its employee, stating at 594:
We are not able to follow the learned district judge in holding that, so
construed, this is a contract by which the Railroad seeks to exempt itself from
liability created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act or the Federal Safety
Appliance Act and, hence, void under 45 U.S.C.A. § 55. The Railroad did not
seek to escape liability to its employee. To the contrary, it settled with him
fairly and honorably. The contract, construed as contended for by Appellant
Railroad, seems to us to provide for indemnification and not for a limitation of
liability.
The conclusion that § 55 was enacted to protect employees from their
employers is firmly entrenched in the case law and amply supported by the legislative
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ultimate burden of their statutory liability to third parties. Its primary
purpose was to protect railroad employees from economic coercion in order
to assure an effective system of compensation for personal injuries. 148
Because there is nothing in the language of the statute or its legislative
history to prevent the railroad from contractually indemnifying itself
against the consequences of its negligence, any justification for strictly
construing sidetrack indemnity agreements must be found in broader public
policies embodied in state law.
II. The Broader Policy Issues
Any analysis of the policies underlying the practice of strictly
construing contracts which attempt to indemnify a party against the
consequences of his own negligence must take into account the strong public
policy favoring freedom of contract and the societal interest in preserving
the integrity of written instruments. 149 A construction which derogates the
parties' intent as fairly expressed in the language of their contract obviously
runs afoul of these important policy considerations. 150 Consequently, the
process of construing, as distinguished from merely interpreting,' 5 1 spur
history of that section. At the time of its enactment, the purpose of § 55 was explained
on the Senate floor as follows: "The proposed bill undertakes to modify somewhat the
common law applicable to certain agreements or contracts made between employers
and their workmen, in which the latter agree, in consideration of some form of
insurance or indemnity fund, to give up the right to sue in the courts." 60 CONG. REC.
4527 (1908) (emphasis added). See generally W. THORNTON, FEDERAL EMPLOYERS'
LIABILITY ACT 265-74 (3d ed. 1916); Richter & Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act,
12 F.R.D. 13, 52-57 (1952).
148. Although the fact that this section was directed at a particular mischief does
not obviate the broader safety goals of the Act, it is perhaps significant that Congress
did not utilize the nonexemption provision to limit or proscribe contracts purporting
to relieve the railroad of monetary responsibility for statutory violations.
149. See, e.g., Sante Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co., 228 U.S. 177 (1913)
("the highest public policy is found in the enforcement of the contract which was
actually made").
150. Respect for these policies has led a few courts to reject the strict construction
principle as applied to indemnity contracts. E.g., Batchkowsky v. Penn Cent. Co., 525
F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1975) (sidetrack indemnity agreement should be construed to
effectuate the parties' intent, and where that is debatable or ambiguous, it should be
viewed realistically as an effort by businessmen to allocate as between them the cost
of expense of the risk of accidents apt to arise on a fairly predictable basis); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226 (1939) (contract of
indemnity against damages resulting from the indemnitee's own negligence should be
construed fairly to accomplish its purpose rather than subjected to an arbitrary or
strict construction which would defeat the intent of the parties).
151. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 534, at 9 (rev. ed. 1960) explains: "By 'interpreta-
tion of language' we determine what ideas that language induces in other persons. By
'construction of the contract,' as that term is used here, we determine its legal
operation - its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials."
Contractual language can, as a matter of interpretation, induce ideas which embody
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track indemnity agreements must often be viewed as a process of balancing
conflicting policy interests.
52
The policy favoring strict construction 153 of agreements which purport
to hold the indemnitee harmless for damages arising from his own
negligence is summarized in the comment to section 572 of the Restatement
of Contracts. Section 572 declares that "a bargain to indemnify another
against the consequences of committing a tortious act is illegal unless the
performance of the tortious act is only an undesired possibility in the
performance of the bargain, and the bargain does not tend to induce the
act."' 154 The rationale of this rule is obviously that agreements which
insulate a party from the financial consequences of his negligent acts tend
to promote, or at least fail to discourage, negligent acts.155
As a matter of public policy courts have understandably been reluctant
to construe contracts in a manner which might encourage negligence rather
than inhibit it. The principal shortcoming of the spur track indemnity cases
is found in their application of this safety policy to FELA liability as a
matter of unexamined assumption rather than thoughtful analysis. In
declining to follow "the cases which seem to thwart contractual intention
solely upon the ground that to give literal effect thereto would relieve a
the parties' intent and at the same time be construed so as to have a legal effect
different from this expressed intent because the court's action is also affected by
external policy considerations. The contract can thus be interpreted as meaning X
and construed as meaning Y. See generally Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967).
152. Compare Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Carter, 95 Tex. 461, 68 S.W. 159 (1902)
(indemnity contract relieving the railroad of losses from its liability for property
damage caused by its own negligence held not void as contrary to public policy in
view of the paramount public policy, fundamental to freedom of contract, requiring
that contracts be given the meaning which the parties ascribed to them) and Santa
Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 188 (1913) ("the highest public
policy is found in the enforcement of the contract which was actually made") with
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 79 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 704 (1936) (because the public has an interest in the life and safety of human
beings, indemnity contracts with respect to personal injuries are governed by a
different rule from that applying to contracts indemnifying against property damage).
153. Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 18 (1948) ("Limiting Liability for Own Negligence")
concludes that "[bly construing every exemption clause which does not expressly refer
to negligence, as not intended to include negligence, the courts have succeeded in
emasculating liability exemption conditions generally and by this device have found
a convenient subterfuge for practically invalidating stipulations limiting liability for
negligence." Although this conclusion is perhaps overstated, it is illustrative of the
policy which impels courts to apply the contribution clause rather than the indemnity
provision when the railroad is negligent under the FELA standard.
154. RESTATEMENT of CoNTRAcTs § 572 (1932).
155, Comment a to § 572 explains: "The tendency of a bargain to indemnify
against the consequences of committing a tort is to induce its commission. Therefore,
the objection to such bargains is similar to the objection to a bargain to pay directly
for the commission of a tort."
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contractor from the legal result of his own negligence," 15 6 one of the few
railroad injury cases addressing the encouragement of negligence issue
declared:
Quite fanciful is the suggestion that to hold as we do is "to put a
premium on negligence rather than to discourage it." Particularly in the
field of railroads and construction contractors, the results of negligence
are so onerous and, the humanities and money aside, so altogether
annoying, that only the extreme of inexperience would harbor the
thought that a contract of the instant sort would operate in the slightest
degree as a premium on and so an inducement to negligence. 15 7
It is the "onerous" and "altogether annoying" nature of initial liability in
FELA cases which presumably renders the tortious act giving rise to FELA
liability "only an undesired possibility," but the argument quoted above
must be evaluated in light of the fact that "[i]n 1907, the year before the Act
was passed, 4,534 railroad men were killed in railroad work and 87,634 were
injured. In 1950, more men were engaged in railroad work, but only 329 were
killed and 22,000 injured .... "1118 These figures can certainly be read as an
indication that the burden imposed by statute has had a substantial impact
upon railroad safety and that the railroad should bear the full burden of
FELA liability for spur track accidents. There are of course many factors in
addition to the enactment of FELA which may have influenced this
pattern, 159 but the decisions construing sidetrack indemnity contracts have
failed to explore either the safety impact of the statute in general, or the
safety implications of strict versus neutral construction of the indemnity
agreements in particular. This evaluative process is of obvious importance
in a rational balancing of the policies which militate in favor of either strict
or neutral construction. It is especially important when the court is
departing from contract principles on the theory that its departure will
promote the public policy of encouraging railroad safety. The wider policy
considerations would seem to dictate that departures from traditional
principles of contract construction, and the abandonment of the policies
which these principles embody, be undertaken only on the basis of clearly
articulated and empirically sound principles of public policy. Such principles
are not evident in the case law.
156. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 197, 288 N.W. 226,
228 (1939).
157. Id. (citations omitted). The case concerned a contract for indemnity against
property damage but its conclusion, if sound, would seem to apply with even greater
force to personal injury liability under the FELA. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 79 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 704 (1936).
158. Lewis, Federal Employers Liability Act, 14 S.C.L.Q. 447, 447 (1962).
159. Most conspicuous are mechanical improvements in railroad equipment and
the promulgation of explicit safety requirements both by statute and regulation.
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III. The Balance Struck by the Majority Rule Synthesis
and the Departures from it
By holding that the parties' rights under an agreement which provides
for either indemnity or contribution, according to the nature of the accident,
are governed by their contract, but that common law principles of active and
passive negligence control the reconciliation of an apparent conflict
generated by its clauses, the majority view merges construction and
interpretation into a rational synthesis. As a matter of interpretation it is
reasonable to assume that the parties considered the common law rules of
indemnity and contribution in formulating the language of their contract
and that their contractual intent can therefore best be discerned against this
background. Although there are cases holding that the existence of a written
indemnity contract precludes any application of common law active-passive
negligence principles,16° these principles appear to provide the most sensible
means of determining the parties' intent when a combination of indemnity
clauses has created an ambiguity which must be resolved. From a
construction perspective, it is significant that active-passive negligence
theory was developed at common law as a means of placing the ultimate
burden of liability on the principal wrongdoer. Hence the majority view's
utilization of active-passive negligence analysis advances to a significant
degree the policy promoted through strict construction. Whenever the
railroad's negligence rises to the level of the industry's negligence, the
railroad's right to recovery is limited to contribution. The railroad is thus
unable to insulate itself completely from the consequences of its own serious
negligence. The majority rule's restrained application of active and passive
negligence principles provides a theoretical framework for limited policy-
oriented construction while pursuing the important policies of neutral
construction and the preservation of the parties' manifested intent.
However, the central question in this analysis - what constitutes "active"
or primary negligence and what policy considerations are in fact implicated
by permitting indemnity for FELA liability? - has not been addressed
adequately by the courts. This analytical failure is particularly evident in
the decisions which engage most heavily in policy-oriented construction.
Reasoned analysis has too often been replaced by word formulae in this
area of the law.161 As one court has stated, "[t]he unanalyzed terminology of
'active' and 'passive' conduct ... results . . .in beclouding of the crucial
issue. The phrasing shows what confusion will arise if we attempt to fit
160. See notes 43 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
161. The inadequacies of active-passive negligence analysis have been documented
and analyzed at length by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Davis, Indemnity
Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1952);
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEx. L. REV. 150 (1947);
30 Mo. L. REV. 624 (1965). Moreover, Davis concludes that "theories of active and
passive negligence are least appropriate in certain indemnity cases involving the
safety of one's premises." Davis, supra, at 542.
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specific cases into bar cubicles of easy nomenclature." 162 Another comment-
ator has articulated the essence of the problem by stating that
while certain considerations of policy may justify the shifting of a loss
from an injured plaintiff to a defendant, the same or different policies
may require a further shift of loss from that particular defendant to
another. A layman might say: "Yes, it's a good thing to make the
original defendant pay the injured plaintiff, but the real wrongdoer
(with the accent on the 'real') is another and he should be required to
repay the original defendant."
Of course, the important question is: what constitutes one of the two
tortfeasors the "real" wrongdoer, or what policy justifies the shifting of
loss from one tortfeasor to another.1 3
In the context of a dual-clause sidetrack agreement the question becomes:
when does the railroad's fault in breaching its FELA duty place it in pari
delicto with the industry and what policy justifies the application of the
contribution clause in order to prevent the railroad from shifting its entire
loss to the industry in accordance with the apparent intent of the parties? In
answering this question, it is necessary to consider the importance of
allowing the parties to allocate contractually the risk of FELA liability, and
the importance of respecting the contract that the parties actually made (or
thought they were making).
Reliance on the doctrine of acquiescence or manipulated theories of
active and passive negligence 64 so as to apply the contribution clause in
virtually all cases clearly defeats the parties' contractual intent in many
instances, while strongly emphasizing the safety policies thought to be
advanced through the strict construction doctrine. Almost without excep-
tion, sidetrack indemnity agreements are executed for the purpose of
protecting the railroad against the increased exposure to liability concomit-
ant with the operation of its trains on property owned by another and thus
beyond the railroad's control. This purpose is not effectuated unless the
contract is construed to provide full indemnity when the railroad's
negligence consists of the operation of its train after a failure to discover, or
to request the correction of, an unsafe condition created by the industry. The
162. Falk v. Crystall Hall, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70-71 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
163. Hodges, supra note 161, at 160 (emphasis added).
164. As Davis points out, the active-passive negligence classification can be (and
is) made to depend on the manner of expression of a fact situation:
The inconclusiveness of distinguishing between "active" and "passive"
negligence by application of the test of "commission" or "omission" is patent.
The result can depend on how a particular bit of conduct is described. For
example, A might be considered as "actively" negligent in digging a hole in
the street or only "passively" negligent in failing to barricade the hole. Again
A might be "actively" negligent for driving his car too fast, or "passively"
negligent in failing to bring it to a timely stop.
Davis, supra note 161, at 541.
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cases which apply the contribution clause on variations of the theory that
the railroad negligently "acted" on the condition created by the industry165
tend to employ active-passive negligence analysis as a rather blunt
instrumentality of public policy, not as a guide to the parties' intent.166
Acquiescence as implied waiver, a doctrine distinguishable from active
negligence,' 67 is similarly inconsistent with the policy favoring neutral
construction and freedom of contract. "To constitute an estoppel by silence
or acquiescence, it must appear that the party to be estopped was bound in
equity and good conscience to speak, and that the party claiming estoppel
relied upon the acquiescence and was misled thereby to change his position
to his prejudice."' 68 None of the spur track cases, particularly none of the
three-clause cases discussed above, purports to apply the acquiescence
doctrine on this contract-oriented basis. They rely instead on the doctrine as
expressed in the caveat at the end of section 95 of the Restatement of
Restitution,169 without attempting to rationalize the application of this
common law concept to contract cases or to answer the objection that the
industry has "contracted away" its right to rely on the common law defense
of acquiescence. It is unlikely that the parties intended that the (often
express) contractual right to indemnity created by their agreement be
defeated on the same terms that the common law indemnity right described
in section 95, which would have existed had there been no contract, may be
defeated. While this fact alone does not compel the conclusion that policy-
oriented construction is necessarily misguided, it does suggest that
substantial safety policies must in fact be promoted through strict
construction if that policy-oriented approach is to be justified.
In striking a balance between neutral construction and fidelity to
manifested intent, and the safety policy against contractual insulation from
the consequences of one's own negligence, the departures from the majority
rule tip the scales heavily in favor of public policy without undertaking the
analysis necessary to justify this position. Attention must be focused both
on the interests which are sacrificed and interests which are actually
promoted through a particular theory of construction. The departures, and to
a lesser extent the majority view, have failed to do this.
165. See text accompanying notes 69 to 72 supra. It is difficult to ascertain what
policy is served by making motion an operative criterion of active negligence without
further inquiry into the relative faults and duties of the parties, but this has been
done. See, e.g., Detroit, Gr. H. & M.R.R. v. Boomer, 194 Mich. 52, 160 N.W. 542 (1916).
The railroad not only has the right to operate its trains over the track but does so in
the service of the industry.
166. See text accompanying notes 54 to 107 supra.
167. As a species of active negligence, the acquiescence doctrine generates the
problems of imprecision and fidelity to contractual intent discussed in notes 162 to 165
supra.
168. Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 217, 76 P.2d 87, 91 (1938), quoted in
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 40 (4th ed. 1951).
169. See note 28 supra.
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IV. Toward a More Rational Balance
The question of what policy should be furthered by the construction of
FELA indemnity agreements is clouded by a lack of empirical evidence
which would support reliable conclusions as to the relative safety incentives
of allowing the railroad either full indemnity or contribution. It seems
reasonable to assume that the prospect of financial responsibility for serious
injuries and deaths would exert some influence upon the behavior of both
railroads and industries. From this perspective, the temptation is to divide
the loss between them in order to encourage both parties to act safely. On
the other hand, the expense and annoyance of litigating the issue of primary
liability, in addition to humanitarian considerations, must be regarded as a
substantial safety incentive to the railroad regardless of whether or not it
must ultimately share the burden it seeks to shift.
The resolution of the safety incentive dilemma must also turn on the
question of who is the most effective risk avoider. If railroads can in fact
effectively exercise control over safety conditions on industry property, their
presumed superiority in recognizing and evaluating potential hazards would
seem to make them a centralized and efficient risk avoider and, hence, the
logical focal point of judicially-fashioned safety incentives. However, if the
railroads cannot exercise such control, then restricting their ability to shift
the burden of FELA liability cannot be justified on the theory that this
would diminish their incentive to provide railroad employees with a safe
place to work.1E0 Moreover, such a restriction might well reduce the
industries' incentive to ensure safe conditions on property which they
control. In this circumstance, therefore, safety would be more effectively
promoted through a neutral construction policy which allows the railroad,
consistent with the expressed intent of the parties, to shift its statutory
burden to the owner-industry as the party in the best position to avoid the
liability-producing risks. Finally, equitable considerations based on per-
ceived relative fault and fundamental fairness ought to be recognized. All
things being equal, justice dictates that the more "blameworthy" party
should bear the loss or at least a portion of it.
These considerations of control and blameworthiness might well form
the nucleus of a more clearly articulated, rational public policy against
which the countervailing societal interests of freedom of contract and the
integrity of written instruments could be weighed. Policy considerations
currently play an important, if unexamined, role in the construction of
sidetrack agreements; but concepts of relative fault have been applied
mechanically with a minimum of judicial attention to the question of what
170. In this context it should be noted that §95 of the RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, the rule which according to the majority view is enunciated by the
indemnity clause, applies to a landowner's negligent failure to make safe a condition
created on his land by another. Because a landowner presumably is able to exercise
greater control over his land than is the railroad over land owned by an industry, the
argument for indemnity would appear to be even stronger in the spur track cases.
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exactly determines which of the tortfeasors is the "real" wrongdoer, and
what policy justifies the restrictions placed on the shifting of FELA loss to
third parties who own sidetracks used by railroads.
On a more general level, several theories have been advanced by
commentators in an effort to resolve the "indemnity tangle" which has
resulted from confusion in the jurisprudence of relative fault. It has been
suggested that the fundamental error in the use of active and passive
negligence terminology 171 is its focus on the character of the breach rather
than on a disproportion or difference in the character of duties owed by the
potential defendants to the plaintiff.172 Another commentator has focused on
the nature of the duties between the indemnitor and indemnitee: "When
there are two tortfeasors, either or both of whom has breached a duty which
he owed to his co-tortfeasor and to the injured third person, then the
tortfeasor who, to his co-tortfeasor, is blameless, should be allowed
indemnity."'173 Finally, it is often said that the right to indemnity is
,predicated on a great difference in the gravity of the fault of the two
tortfeasors. 1 4
Each of these broad theoretical perspectives has some relevance to the
problem of determining the policies that should be furthered in the
construction of spur track indemnity agreements and to the determination of
the most appropriate approach to the mechanics of construction in
furtherance of those policies. Some form of relative fault-duty analysis is
necessary to harmonize the indemnity and contribution clauses, and the
171. Other catch words [in addition to active-passive and primary-secondary
negligence] which have been used by the courts [in various contexts] include:
"constructive" and "actual" negligence, "party immediately in fault,"
"positive tort" and "primary and efficient cause," "primary and active
wrongdoer," "principal wrongdoer," "principal delinquent," "primary cause,"
"real cause," "principal and moving cause," "the wrongdoer in the physically
participative sense and the wrongdoer in the legally relative sense,"
"concurrent or joint tort-feasors as distinguished from related tort-feasors,"
"active wrongdoer or primarily negligent party."
Davis, supra note 161, at 543-44 (footnotes omitted).
172. It is more important that most of us act like ordinary men with respect to the
safety of our fellow humans than that a few of us observe a level of conduct
far above the ordinary.
... It seems entirely proper for the law to say that, as between two
persons liable to an injured person, the one who breached the less exacting
duty should have to bear the full loss, as a matter of morals or as a matter of
public policy. But if the difference is just one of degree of causation, and the
duties which are owed to the injured person are roughly equal, then the case
seems more proper for contribution.
To put it another way, negligent tort-feasors who breach different
qualities of duties toward an injured person can be considered to be on
different "planes of fault" - which difference is important enough to warrant
a complete shifting of the loss from one to another. But tortfeasors who
breach substantially equal duties are on the same "plane of fault" and should
share the loss.
Id. at 547 (emphasis in original).
173. Hodges, supra note 161, at 162 (emphasis omitted).
174. See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 313 and cases cited in n.4 of § 51.
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majority view's restrained application of common law indemnity rules may
thus be viewed as a necessary departure from pure contract principles. The
larger task is to formulate a reasoned public policy with regard to the
purposes served by the strict construction of FELA indemnity agreements,
to develop a relative fault-duty negligence terminology which will consist-
ently express that policy, and to balance the interests underlying the
restrictive construction policy against the interests inherent in the neutral
construction of written contracts.
CONCLUSION
The recurrent issues generated by the application of multi-clause
indemnity agreements to FELA liability arising out of spur track accidents
have not been resolved consistently. For a variety of reasons, courts
continue to reach disparate conclusions in the course of applying substan-
tially identical contract language to substantially identical facts. This
inconsistency is largely a reflection of a conflict between neutral contract
principles and the generally accepted policy against construing a contract
as indemnifying a party against the legal consequences of his own
negligence.
The jurisdictions that have emphasized policy considerations over
contract principles have done so largely on the basis of unexamined policy
assumptions and a mechanical application of confused terminology, without
confronting the policy ramifications of the particular facts before them.
175 It
is by no means clear that the practice of strict construction in fact
encourages safety or directs the burden of liability to the "real" wrongdoer
in the special circumstances of negligence and liability under the Federal
Employers Liability Act.176 What is clear is that in many cases the doctrine
175. It is also possible that courts have been influenced by the fact that the lower
standard of liability established by the Act allows the railroad in effect to make the
industry (indirectly) liable to the plaintiff in situations where it would not be liable if
the injured employee had proceeded against the industry directly. The most common
example of this situation is contributory negligence on the part of the railroad
employee, which is no bar to his FELA claim against the railroad but would often bar
the employee's claim had he sued the industry directly. Another possible influence is
an intuitive feeling that Congress (for reasons of loss distribution, etc.) intended that
the burden of these injuries should fall on the railroad. No court has made this
argument but its potential influence should not be overlooked.
176. It is generally acknowledged that the statute holds railroads to a much higher
standard of care than did the common law. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d
365 (5th Cir. 1969) ("slight negligence" necessary to support an action under the
FELA is defined as a failure to exercise great care and the burden of proof is much
less than the burden required to sustain recovery in ordinary negligence actions);
Slaughter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 302 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir.) ("negligence" under the
FELA does not mean negligence in the common law sense and is a term of broader
significance), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 827 (1962). Because the railroad is liable under the
statute for negligent acts over which it has little or no control, the deterrent effect of
restricting its ability to shift FELA liability is obviously diminished.
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of strict construction frustrates the expressed intent of the parties. A
conclusion as to the "correct" approach to the construction of dual-clause
indemnity agreements must be based on a thoughtful reconciliation of
ostensibly conflicting interests, an approach which is now conspicuously
lacking in the case law.
